I think for the people who accept the drowning child scenario I outlined last time, it should be relatively easy to understand a convincing argument based in the Problem of Evil (How could a god that is supposed to omnibenevolent, or at the very least good, be said to exist, alongside the existence of gratuitous evil/suffering?) for how a god/gods likely do not exist. This is different than simply saying, "I don't think there isn't any good evidence to say that a god exists," and is more like saying, "I think the evidence suggests that, in fact, no gods exist."
My argument basically goes like this:
P1: The Drowning Child Scenario gives us an accurate understanding of our moral obligation relative to suffering/dying human beings in the case where we can easily do something about it.
P2: If we behave in accordance with what follows from this scenario, we can be said to be behaving morally good.
P3: Virtually all definitions of Gods include the characteristics of omniscience (all-knowingness), omnibenevolence (all-goodness), and while maybe not omnipotent, at least extremely powerful.
P4: A God that has these characteristics is, in essence, always walking past a pond with a drowning child, and has no excuse, due to its omniscience and extreme power, not to prevent the horrible gratuitous suffering that is persistent in the world, without sacrificing its omnibenevolent status.
.˙. At the very least, any person who wants to say a good God exists, is necessarily wrong, unless their God is ignorant of the happenings of the world, or just isn’t strong enough to prevent them. But if that is the case, what is the purpose of calling it a God?
I hope that was clear and concise. Feel free to ask questions or comment about it. I think I'm going to bed now. Good night.
Follow me on Twitter here! I tweet frequently.
Follow me on Twitter here! I tweet frequently.